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Article 67 Rights of the accused 
 
1. In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a public hearing, 
having regard to the provisions of this Statute, to a fair hearing conducted impartially, 
and to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: 
• (a) To be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the 
charge, in a language which the accused fully understands and speaks; 
• (b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence and to 
communicate freely with counsel of the accused’s choosing in confidence; 
• (c) To be tried without undue delay; 
• (d) Subject to article 63, paragraph 2, to be present at the trial, to conduct the 
defence in person or through legal assistance of the accused’s choosing, to be 
informed, if the accused does not have legal assistance, of this right and to have 
legal assistance assigned by the Court in any case where the interests of justice so 
require, and without payment if the accused lacks sufficient means to pay for it; 
• (e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to obtain 
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him or her. The accused shall also be entitled to raise 
defences and to present other evidence admissible under this Statute; 
• (f) To have, free of any cost, the assistance of a competent interpreter and such 
translations as are necessary to meet the requirements of fairness, if any of the 
proceedings of or documents presented to the Court are not in a language which the 
accused fully understands and speaks; 
• (g) Not to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silent, without 
such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence; 
• (h) To make an unsworn oral or written statement in his or her defence; and 
• (i) Not to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof or any 
onus of rebuttal. 
2. In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as 
soon as practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession or 
control which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or 
to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution 
evidence. In case of doubt as to the application of this paragraph, the Court shall decide. 
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A. Introduction/General remarks 
1 
During the Second World War, Churchill and other Allied leaders flirted with the idea of 
some form of summary justice for major war criminals.1 The concept now is unthinkable. 
Indeed, only a few years later, one of the Nuremberg Tribunals held that prosecutors and 
judges involved in a trial lacking the fundamental guarantees of fairness could be held 
responsible for crimes against humanity. Such guarantees include the right of the accused to 
introduce evidence, to confront witnesses, to present evidence, to be tried in public, to have 
counsel of choice, and to be informed of the nature of the charges.2 Certainly, the credibility 
of international justice depends on rigorous respect for the rights of the accused to a fair trial, 
an idea that was frequently expressed during the development of the ICC Statute. Nor can the 
exemplary role of international courts be gainsaid; their treatment of the accused provides a 
model to domestic justice systems throughout the world in the respect of fundamental human 
rights. 
2 
The Statute might well have omitted a general provision dealing with the rights of the 
accused. Many specific guarantees are incorporated in other Articles of the Statute and there 
can be little doubt that even in the absence of a more general text, the judges would feel 
bound by internationally recognized norms. Principle 5 of the UN Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary provides: ‘The principle of the independence of the judiciary 
entitles and requires the judiciary to ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and 
that the rights of the parties are respected’.3 The Statute imposes a duty upon the TC to see 
that ‘a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the 
accused’ (Art. 64(1)). Furthermore, there is the constant danger that any codification, left in 
the hands of conservative judges, may tend to constrict the development of the law rather than 
enhance it. The original contribution of Article 67 may well be that rather than merely restate 
norms that have already been codified, it elaborates on the relatively laconic provisions of 
existing texts and, moreover, develops new rights which do not yet appear in human rights 
treaties and declarations. 
3 
The right to a fair trial is recognized in the UDHR,4 and in the universal and regional human 
rights conventions that it inspired,5 as well as in humanitarian law instruments.6 The model 
for Article 67 of the Statute is Article 14 ICCPR,7 although with some major distinctions. 
 
1 Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg (1998) 63–91. 
2 U.S. v. Alstötter et al. (‘Justice trial’), (1948) 3 TWC 1, 6 LRTWC 1, 14 I.L.R. 278, p. 97 (LRTWC); 
see further, DePiazza (2017) 15 JICJ 257.  
3 UN, Seventh UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,UN Doc. 
A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1, GA Res. 40/146, 26 Aug. - 6 Sep.1985. The Basic Principles are cited in the preamble 
of the ICC’s Code of Judicial Ethics, Doc. ICC-BD/02-01-05. 
4 Art. 10 and Art. 11 UDHR.‘Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal 
charge against him. Article 11(3). Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his 
defence’. 
5 Art. 14 ICCPR; Art. 8 ACHR; Art. 6 ECHR; Article 7 AfricanChHPR; Art. 40(2) Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.. 
6 Arti. 84-87, 99-108 GC III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; Art. 5, 64-76 GC(IV) 
Relative to the Protection of Civilians; Art. 75 Add. Prot.I to the 1949 GC and Relating to The Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Art. 6 Add. Prot. II to the 1949 GC and Relating to The Protection of 
Victims of Non- International Armed Conflicts. 
7 It was also the model for the provisions dealing with the rights of the accused in Art. 21 ICTY Statute 
and Art. 20 ICTR Statute. The SG’s Report, UN Doc. S/25704, para. 106, stated: ‘It is axiomatic that the 
International Tribunal must fully respect internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused 
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Article 14 ICCPR applies to civil and administrative proceedings, as well as criminal trials. 
Articles 14(1) and (4) contain provisions dealing with trial of juvenile offenders which are 
irrelevant to the work of the ICC because Article 26 ICCSt. excludes jurisdiction in the case 
of suspects who were under eighteen years of age at the time of the offence. The ICCPR fair 
trial provision also recognizes some specific rights that are enshrined elsewhere in the Statute, 
notably the presumption of innocence (Article 65), a right of appeal (Articles 81-84), to 
compensation in cases of erroneous conviction (Article 85), and to protection against double 
jeopardy (Article 20). 
4 
The ILC Draft Statute 1994 contained a provision entitled ‘Rights of the Accused’ that was 
essentially a copy of Article 14(3) ICCPR.8 The only significant departure was inclusion of a 
second paragraph requiring the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defence. In 
addition, the ILC made the text gender neutral, replacing masculine pronouns with reference 
to ‘the accused’. In 1995, the Ad Hoc Committee of the GA examined the ILC Draft Statute, 
observing that ‘in view of the considerable powers [the Court] would enjoy in relation to 
individuals, [it] should be bound to apply the highest standards of justice, integrity and due 
process’.9 Its discussion focussed on the issue of mandatory legal assistance, and on the need 
to establish rules on the qualifications, powers and remuneration of defence attorneys, and on 
the procedure for their appointment by the Court.10 
5 
Rights of the accused were considered by the informal WG at the August 1996 session of the 
PrepCom, and a number of detailed comments and suggestions on specific points appear in 
the report of these discussions.11 The subject was again addressed by the PrepCom in August 
1997. By this point, the innovative spirit of the PrepCom was becoming apparent, and there 
were many departures from the text of Article 14(3) ICCPR, several of them without square 
brackets, indicating that they had been agreed to by consensus.12 There were also many cross-
references to other provisions in the Statute, showing the Committee’s concern that the rights 
of the accused not only be recognized generally, but that they be reflected in specific 
procedural provisions. In addition to ‘improved’ versions of the rights set out in Article 14 of 
the ICCPR, the Committee’s 1997 draft also contained several new rights: to make an 
unsworn statement, to have the Court seek co- operation in gathering evidence, to be 
protected against any reverse onus or duty of rebuttal, to be free from unjust search and 
seizure, and a general entitlement to due process. The August 1997 PrepCom’s text was 
reproduced in the Zutphen compilation and the Final Draft of the PrepCom with little 
modification.13 
6 
The Rome Conf. quickly agreed on most of the provisions in Article 67. It was made quite 
clear to the delegates that the minimum guarantees enshrined in Article 14 ICCPR were being 
enlarged, and they were invited to accept or reject such an approach. The Conference adopted 
the latter route without hesitation. Negotiating difficulties with the provisions concerning 
appearance at trial, funded counsel and disclosure of evidence by the prosecution took slightly 
more time to be resolved. The proposals concerning search and seizure and due process were 
dropped as being redundant. 
 
at all stages of its proceedings. In the view of the Secretary-General, such internationally recognized standards 
are, in particular, contained in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’. 
8 ILC Draft Statute 1994, Art. 41. 
9 Ad Hoc Committee Report, para. 129, p. 29. 
10 Ibid., para. 175, p. 35. 
11 PrepCom I 1996, paras. 270–279, pp. 57–59. 
12 PrepCom Decisions Aug. 1997, pp. 34–36. 
13 Zutphen Draft, pp. 114–115; Draft Statute for the ICC, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Rev.1, pp. 126–128. 
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B. Analysis and interpretation of elements 
I. Paragraph 1 
1. Chapeau 
7 
The chapeau provision of Article 67 is an amalgam of norms contained in paras. 1 and 3 of 
Article 14 of the ICCPR. In effect, it takes the chapeau of Article 14(3) of the ICCPR, with 
minor modifications, and adds the notions of a public, fair and impartial hearing that appear in 
Article 14(1). The text differs significantly from the original ILC Draft14 and reflects a 
proposal made at the Rome Conf., on 2 July, by the Chair of the WG.15 Referring generally to 
Article 67(1) of the Statute and to the right of fair trial, Judge Eboe-Osuji, said that the notion 
of ‘appellate deference’ was difficult to accept where the appellant claims ‘the trial has been 
so unfair as to engage the risk of a miscarriage of justice, because the Trial Chamber made 
serious mistakes in the admission, appreciation and evaluation of the evidence. Where such a 
ground of appeal is engaged in a final appeal against conviction, it does seem to me wholly 
unsatisfactory—indeed counter-intuitive—to say that the ICC AC will defer to the views of 
the very Chamber whose proceedings, verdict or findings formed the very basis of the appeal, 
as the gravamen of the complaint of unfair trial.’.16 
As the title of the provision confirms, the fair trial rights set out belong to ‘the 
accused’. The AC has explained that ‘[i]t is commonly understood that the right to a 
fair trial/fair hearing in criminal proceedings, first and foremost, inures to the benefit 
of the accused’. Moreover, ‘specific rights entrenched in Article 67(1) of the Statute 
are specifically tailored to the needs of the accused person’. It has declined to 
pronounce itself on ‘whether and to what extent the Prosecutor has a “right to a fair 
trial” in the abstract’.17a) ‘any charge’ 
8 
The reference to ‘any charge’ must apply to trials on accusations based on the four core 
crimes enumerated in Article 5 of the Statute, as well as to trials for ‘[o]ffences against the 
administration of justice’, pursuant to Article 70. Some adaptation would appear to be 
required in proceedings for removal of a Registrar or Deputy Registrar, pursuant to Article 
46(3) of the Statute, as these are not criminal in nature. Where the rights set out in Article 67 
 
14 See ILC Draft Statute 1994, Art. 41: ‘In the determination of any charge under this Statute, the accused 
is entitled to a fair and public hearing, subject to article 43, and to the following minimum guarantees: …’. 
15 Draft proposal for Art. 67 submitted by the chairman, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.42 (2 July): 
‘In the determination of any charge, the accused is entitled to a public hearing, having regard to the provisions of 
this Statute, to a fair hearing conducted impartially, and to the following minimum guarantees in full equality’.’ 
It was adopted by the Committee with the addition of the word ‘and’ before the words ‘to afair hearing’: Report 
of the WG on Procedural Matters, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.2 (4 July), pp. 4–5. The Drafting 
Committee removed the word ‘and’, and made other minor changes, Compendium of draft articles referred to the 
Drafting Committee by the Committee of the Whole as of 9 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.58, pp. 41–
42: ‘In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a public hearing, having regard to the 
provisions of this Statute, to a fair hearing conducted impartially, and to the following minimum guarantees, in 
full equality’. 
16  ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, AC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, Concurring Separate Opinion of 
Judge Eboe-Osuji, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx3, 14 June 2018, para. 48.  
17  ICC, Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, AC, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Trial 
Chamber II entitled ‘Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute’, ICC-01/04-02/12-271, 7 April 2015, para. 
561; Prosecutor v. Gbagbo et al., AC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Laurent Gbagbo against the decision of 
Trial Chamber I of 8 July 2015 entitled ‘Ninth decision on the review of Mr Laurent Gbagbo’s detention 
pursuant to Article 60(3) of the Statute’, ICC-02/11-01/15-208, 8 Sep. 2015, para. 87. 
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do not apply necessarily is in other proceedings before the Court, for example those relating 
to a hearing subsequent to a decision by the Prosecutor not to proceed with charges under 
Article 53(3), or to conduct an investigation pursuant to Articles 56-58. Indeed, rights during 
an investigation are set out in Article 55 of the Statute. Nevertheless, the phrase ‘in the 
determination of any charge’ is essentially identical to the wording of the international 
models, such as Article 6(1) of the ECHR. In a separate opinion, Judge Perrin de 
Brichambault referred to the wording of the Convention in determining that Omar Al Bashir 
had been informed of ‘the charge‘ by the issuance of an arrest warrant.18 The ECtHR 
considers this to be ‘the official notification given to an individual by the competent authority 
of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence’ or an act that has ‘the implication 
of such an allegation and which likewise substantially affects the situation of the suspect’.19 
An individual might become ‘substantially affected’, to borrow the Strasbourg terminology, 
once a State party has asked that a case be examined pursuant to Article 14(1) of the Statute, 
or upon the application by the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation under Article 15(3). If 
notions of complementarity are factored in, the right may even be extended to encompass 
proceedings under domestic law prior to exercise of jurisdiction of the Court. 
b) ‘public hearing’ 
9 
The principle of a public hearing, stated in the chapeau of Article 67 (1), is developed in the 
Regulations of the Court (‘RegC’). Regulation 20 states: 
1. All hearings shall be held in public, unless otherwise provided in the Statute, Rules, these 
Regulations or ordered by the Chamber. 
2. When a Chamber orders that certain hearings be held in closed session, the Chamber 
shall make public the reasons for such an order. 
3. A Chamber may order the disclosure of all or part of the record of closed proceedings 
when the reasons for ordering its non-disclosure no longer exist. 
The Regulations provide for broadcasting and recording of hearings. Reg. 21(1) says that 
‘publicity of hearings may extend beyond the courtroom and may be through broadcasting by 
the Registry or release of transcripts or recordings, unless otherwise ordered by the Chamber’. 
According to Regulation 21(2), ‘[i[n order to protect sensitive information, broadcasts of 
audio- and videorecordings of all hearings shall, unless otherwise ordered by the Chamber, be 
delayed by at least 30 minutes’.20 
The text of Article 67 of the Statute differs from that of Article 14 of the ICCPR in that it does 
not enumerate the exceptions to the right to a public hearing. Article 14 (1) of the ICCPR 
allows the exclusion of the press and the public ‘for reasons of morals, public order (ordre 
public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of 
the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special 
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice’. Moreover, according 
to the ICCPR, the judgment must always be made public ‘except where the interest of 
juvenile persons otherwise requires’.21 A detailed enumeration of exceptions to the public 
hearing principle had been proposed but was rejected by the PrepCom. These derogations 
included: the deliberations of the Court; protection of public order or of human dignity; the 
 
18  ICC, Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, PTC II, Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-
compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, 
Minority Opinion of Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, ICC-02/05-01/09-302-Anx, 6 June 2017, para. 18. 
19 ECtHR, Corigliano v. Italy, 8304/78, 10 Dec. 1982, para. 34. Also O’Halloran and Francis v. the 
United Kingdom [GC], nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, § 35, ECHR 2007-III 
20 See also Reg. 42 RegR. 
21 Note that Art. 76(4) ICC Statute requires that the judgment be rendered in public. 
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safety and protection of the accused, of the victims or of witnesses. Victims of sexual violence 
were to be entitled as of right to an in camera hearing.22 
10 
To the extent there is a residual power to derogate from the norm of a public hearing, it is 
found in Article 64 (7): ‘The trial shall be held in public. The Trial Chamber may, however, 
determine that special circumstances require that certain proceedings be in closed session for 
the purposes set forth in Article 68, or to protect confidential or sensitive information to be 
given in evidence’. That the public hearing requirement of the chapeau of Article 67 is 
subordinate to Article 64(7)is implied by the words ‘having regard to the provisions of this 
Statute’ in the chapeau. In any case, the exceptions listed in Article 64(7) are presented in a 
more elaborate fashion in Articles 68, 69 and 72. According to the RegC, ‘[a]t the request of a 
participant or the Registry, or proprio motu … the Chamber may, in the interests of justice, 
order that any information likely to present a risk to the security or safety of victims, 
witnesses or other persons, or likely to be prejudicial to national security interests, shall not be 
published in any broadcast, audio- or video-recording or transcript of a public hearing’.23 
11 
Article 68 concerns the protection of victims and witnesses. Specifically, Article 68 (2) 
provides: ‘As an exception to the principle of public hearings provided for in Article 67, the 
Chambers of the Court may, to protect victims and witnesses or an accused, conduct any part 
of the proceedings in camera or allow the presentation of evidence by electronic or other 
special means. In particular, such measures shall be implemented in the case of a victim of 
sexual violence or a child who is a victim or a witness, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, 
having regard to all the circumstances, particularly the views of the victim or witness’. A 
mere glance at the jurisprudence of the Court indicates just how dramatic an impact issues 
concerning victim and witness protection can have on the general principle of public hearing 
and access to the record.24 Many hearings are held totally or partially in camera, and decisions 
are often published in severely redacted versions. 
12 
The second exception allowed by Article 64(7) is the protection of confidential or sensitive 
information. Article 64(6)(c) states that the Trial Chamber may provide for the protection of 
confidential information, as necessary. Such confidential or sensitive information may have 
several sources. There may be claims to confidentiality based on privilege, and the Court is to 
respect this pursuant to Article 69(5), as provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
But the major source of problems with this exception will be information derived from 
sovereign States. Article 68(6) allows a State to apply ‘for necessary measures’ to respect 
‘confidential or sensitive information’. Other exceptions to the rule dictating a public hearing 
are the possibility of in camera and even ex parte hearings with respect to the protection of 
national security information pursuant to Article 72(7), and the power of the court to exclude 
disruptive individuals, including the accused, under Articles 63(2) and 71(1). 
13 
Article 61(1) specifies the right of the accused to be present at the hearing on the confirmation 
of charges. But this would clearly seem to be a hearing ‘[i]n the determination of the charge’ 
of ‘an accused’, and therefore the public hearing rule ought to apply. In other words, not only 
the accused but also the public should have access to such proceedings. The first confirmation 
 
22 PrepCom II 1996, pp. 195–196. 
23 Reg. 21(8) RegC. 
24  For example: ICC, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, TC I, Decision on protective and special 
measures, mode of testimony and the order of appearance of certain upcoming witnesses, ICC-02/11-01/15-
1060, 3 Nov. 2017; Prosecutor v. Ongwen, TC, Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s application for in-court protective 
and special measures’, ICC-02/04-01/15-612, 30 Nov. 2016; Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo et al., TC VII, 
Decision on Prosecution Request for In-Court Protective Measures, ICC-01/05-01/13-1725, 28 Sep. 2015.  
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hearing, that of Thomas Lubanga, was accordingly held in public with considerable publicity. 
PTC even made an order authorizing photography by representatives of the media.25 
c) ‘having regard to the provisions of this Statute’ 
14 
The words ‘having regard to the provisions of this Statute’ suggest that Article 67 can be 
limited by express provisions to the contrary. An example would be Article 64(7), which 
limits the right to a public hearing. The wording in the chapeau of Article 67 is decidedly 
unenthusiastic. The PrepCom Draft did not include any such general provision, preferring to 
enumerate any exceptions to the judicial guarantees recognized to the accused in a specific 
fashion.26 A proposal from the UK submitted at Rome eschewed any equivocation on this 
point, beginning the text of Article 67 with the words ‘[s]ubject to the provisions of this 
Statute …’.27 There is a suggestion in the travaux préparatoires that the words ‘subject to …’ 
put Article 67 in a subordinate position, whereas the words ‘having regard to …’ do not.28 
d) ‘fair hearing’ 
15 
The general right to a ‘fair hearing’ provides defendants with a powerful tool to go beyond the 
text of the Statute, and to require that the Court’s respect for the rights of an accused keep 
pace with the progressive development of human rights law. The AC has defined the term 
‘fair” as being ‘associated with the norms of a fair trial, the attributes of which are an 
inseverable part of the corresponding human right’ and thus its interpretation and application 
is subject to international human rights standards.29 The notion of a fair hearing goes back, in 
international human rights law, to Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Of course, it is repeated in Article 14 of the ICCPR and in the regional instruments. The case 
law of the Strasbourg organs, established to implement the ECHR, has used this residual right 
to a fair hearing to fill in some of the gaps in the more specific provisions.30 That the term 
‘fair hearing’ invites the Court to go beyond the precise terms of Article 67 in appropriate 
circumstances is confirmed by the reference within the chapeau to ‘minimum guarantees’.31 
The term ‘fair hearing’ also suggests that where individual problems with specific rights set 
out in Article 67 do not, on their own, amount to a violation, the requirement of a fair hearing 
may allow a cumulative view and lead to the conclusion that there is a breach where there 
have been a number of apparently minor or less significant encroachments on Article 67.32 
Although Article 67 falls under Part 6, the section of the Statute dedicated to ‘The Trial’, it 
has been held that the duty to ensure fairness extends to the pre-trial stage of proceedings. 
 
25 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, PTC I, Order Authorising the Taking of Photographs at the Hearing of 9 
November 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-671, 6 Nov. 2006. 
26 See Zutphen Draft, p. 114, Art. 60; see 1994 Draft Statute, Art. 67, pp. 106–108. 
27 Proposal submitted by the UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.33 (29 Jun. 1998), p. 1. 
28 See PrepCom I 1996, p. 59, para. 279. 
29 ICC, Situation in the DRC, AC, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of 
Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, ICC-01/04-168, 13 Jul. 2006, 
para. 11. 
30 Harris et al., ECHR (2018), 409–433. 
31 ICC, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo et al., TC I, Decision on the submission and admission of evidence, DissOp 
of Judge Henderson, ICC-02/11-01/15-405, 1 Feb. 2016, para. 9; ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, PTC I,  Decision 
on the final system of disclosure and the establishment of a timetable, ICC-01/04-01/06-102, 16 May 2006, 
para. 97. 
32 ECtHR, Murtaliziya v. Russia [GC], 36658/05,  18 Dec. 2018, para. 33. 
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The international case law has developed the notion of ‘equality of arms’ within the concept 
of the right to a fair trial.33 The ICTY AC has described the principle of equality of arms ‘as 
being only one feature of the wider concept of a fair trial’34. In Tadić, the ICTY AC explained 
that ‘the principle of equality of arms falls within the fair trial guarantee under the Statute’. It 
continued: 
 
‘[U]nder the Statute of the International Tribunal the principle of equality of arms must be 
given a more liberal interpretation than that normally upheld with regard to proceedings 
before domestic courts. This principle means that the Prosecution and the Defence must be 
equal before the Trial Chamber. It follows that the Chamber shall provide every practicable 
facility it is capable of granting under the Rules and Statute when faced with a request by a 
party for assistance in presenting its case. The Trial Chambers are mindful of the difficulties 
encountered by the parties in tracing and gaining access to evidence in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia where some States have not been forthcoming in complying with their 
legal obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal. Provisions under the Statute and the Rules 
exist to alleviate the difficulties faced by the parties so that each side may have equal access 
to witnesses’.35 
 
But ‘equality of arms […] does not necessarily amount to the material equality of possessing 
the same financial and/or personal resources’,36 although the allocation of time and witnesses 
to both sides must be basically proportional.37 
The concept of ‘equality of arms’ was invoked in early decisions of the ICC. For example, 
according to PTC II, ‘[f]airness is closely linked to the concept of ‘equality of arms’, or of 
balance between the parties during the proceedings. As commonly understood, it concerns the 
ability of a party to a proceeding to adequately make its case, with a view to influencing the 
outcome of the proceedings in its favour’.38 There is support for the view that equality of arms 
may also be invoked by other participants in the proceedings, including victims.39 
 
33 ECtHR, Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 55391/13, 57728/13 and 74041/13, 6 Nov. 
2018, para. 187; ECtHR, G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others v. Italy [GC], 1828/06 et al., 28 June 2018 para. 302 ; 
Schabas, CCPR Commentary (2019) 372.For recognition of the principle of ‘equality of arms’ by the ICTY, see: 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Orić, AC, Interlocutory decision on length of defence case, IT-03-68-AR73.2, 20 July 
2005, para. 7. 
34 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordić et al., AC, Decision on the Application by Mario Čerkez for Extension of 
Time to File his Respondent’s Brief, IT-95-14/2-A, 11 Sep. 2001, para. 5. 
35 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, AC, Judgment, IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999, para. 52. The U.S.A. invoked the 
AC’s comments before the IACHR, in a case dealing with capital punishment, as authority for the proposition 
that ‘equality of arms’ concerns procedural but not substantive equality: IACHR, Garza v. U.S.A., 52/01, 4 April 
2001, para. 56. 
36 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema et al., AC, Judgment (Reasons), ICTR-95-1-A, 1 June 2001, paras. 63–
71; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., AC, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Motion for Additional 
Funds, IT-99-37-AR73. 2, 13 Nov. 2003. 
37 Orić, IT-03-68-AR73.2, 20 July 2005, para. 7. 
38 ICC, Situation in Uganda, PTC II, Decision on Prosecutor’s Application for leave to Appeal in Part Pre- 
Trial Chamber II’s Decision on the Prosecutor’s Applications for Warrants of Arrest under Article 58, ICC-
02/04-01/05-20, 19 Aug. 2005, para. 30. See also: Prosecutor v. Lubanga, PTC I, Décision sur la demande 
d’autorisation d’appel de la Défense relative à la transmission des Demandes de participation des victimes, ICC-
01/04-01/06-672, 6 Nov. 2006, p. 7. 
39  ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, TC II, Order relating to the request of the Office of Public Counsel for the 
Victims of 16 September 2016, Opinion of Judge Herrera Carbuccia, ICC-01/04-01/06-3252, 21 Oct. 2016, para. 
6; ICC, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, AC, DissOp of Judge Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza 
to the Majority’s decision dismissing as inadmissible the victims’ appeals against the decision rejecting the 
authorisation of an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-137-Anx-Corr,, 10 March 2020, 
para. 34. See further, Ambos, Treatise ICL III (2016), 62.  
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‘Legal certainty’ is also a component of the right to a fair trial, according to the AC. In 
support, it cited the ECtHR: ‘The right to a fair hearing before a tribunal as guaranteed by 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the 
Convention, which declares, among other things, the rule of law to be part of the common 
heritage of the Contracting States. One of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the 
principle of legal certainty.’40 Accordingly, ‘for the principle of legal certainty to be 
respected, the outcome of the proceedings needs to be predictable to the parties to a degree 
that is reasonable in the circumstances of the case... The clarification of the applicable regime 
and, by extension, the increased predictability of the outcome of the proceedings, by its very 
nature, also significantly affects the expeditious conduct of the proceedings.’41 
e) ‘conducted impartially’ 
16 
The Statute states that the hearing must be ‘conducted impartially’, whereas Article 14 of the 
ICCPR requires that it be conducted ‘by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal’. 
The Zutphen Draft referred to ‘an independent and impartial tribunal’.42 Curiously, the 
statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals impose no requirements in this respect,43 perhaps because the 
Security Council considered the matter to be beyond debate, although this did not prevent 
defendants from raising the issue.44 At the ICC, not only judges, but also the judges, the 
Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors, the Registrar and the Deputy Registrar are required to 
make a solemn undertaking in open court to exercise their functions ‘impartially’.45 
17 
Of course, the issue of impartiality of the judiciary is also addressed elsewhere in the Statute, 
specifically Articles 35, 40, and 41. Impartiality is also protected by specific provisions in the 
Court’s Code of Judicial Ethics: 
 
‘Article 4 Impartiality 
1. Judges shall be impartial and ensure the appearance of impartiality in the discharge of 
their judicial functions. 
2. Judges shall avoid any conflict of interest, or being placed in a situation which might 
reasonably be perceived as giving rise to a conflict of interest’.46 
 
According to the ECtHR, ‘impartiality’ means lack of ‘prejudice or bias’.47 It comprises both 
a subjective and an objective dimension: ‘[t]he existence of impartiality … must be 
determined according to a subjective test, that is, on the basis of the personal conviction of a 
 
40  ECtHR, Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], 3394/03, 29 March 2010, para. 80, cited in ICC, 
Prosecutor v. Katanga, AC, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Katanga Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 
20 November 2009 Entitled ‘Decision on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on 
Unlawful Detention and Stay of Proceedings’, ICC-01/04-01/07-2259, 28 July 2010, para. 59. 
41  ICC, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the 
Kingdom of Cambodia, PTC I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for leave to appeal the “Decision on the 
‘Application for Judicial Review by the Government of the Union of the Comoros”’, ICC-01/13-34, 18 Jan. 
2019, para. 48 
42 See Zutphen Draft, p. 114, Art. 60. 
43 Art. 21, ICTY Statute; Art. 20, ICTR Statute. 
44 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, AC, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-AR72, 2 Oct. 1995. 
45 Art. 45 ICC Statute; Rule 5 RPE ICC. ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, TC I, Decision on the press 
interview with Ms Le Fraper du Hellen, ICC-01/04-01/06-2433, 12 May 2010. 
46 Code of Judicial Ethics, Doc. ICC-BD/02-01-05. 
47 ECtHR, Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 10211/12 and 27505/14, 4 Dec. 2018, para. 287; ECtHR, 
Anželika Šimaitienė v. Lithuania, 36093/13, 21 April 2020, para. 79. 
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particular judge in a given case, and also according to an objective test, namely, ascertaining 
whether the judge offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this 
respect’.48 
The ICTY AC has described judicial impartiality as follows: 
 
‘[A] Judge should not only be subjectively free from bias, but also […] there should be 
nothing in the surrounding circumstances that objectively gives rise to an appearance of bias. 
On this basis, the Appeals Chamber considers that the following principles should direct it in 
interpreting and applying the impartiality requirement of the Statute: 
 
• A. Judge is not impartial if it is shown that actual bias exists. 
• B. There is an unacceptable appearance of bias if: 
• (i) a Judge is a party to the case, or has a financial or proprietary interest in the 
outcome of a case, or if the Judge’s decision will lead to the promotion of a cause in 
which he or she is involved, together with one of the parties. Under these 
circumstances, a Judge’s disqualification from the case is automatic; or 
• (ii) the circumstances would lead a reasonable observer, properly informed, to 
reasonably apprehend bias.49 
 
 
A number of challenges to the independence or impartiality of judges before the ICC have 
arisen in practice. In Lubanga, the defence asked that Judge Song be recused from hearing the 
appeal, on the basis of remarks he had made in his capacity as President of the Court after the 
trial judgment was issued. Judge Song had referred to Lubanga’s conviction as a ‘landmark 
judgment’ and one that ‘set a crucial precedent in the fight against impunity’. The Plenary of 
Judges held that a fair-minded observer would not see these statements in their context as a 
comment on the merits of the appeal or on any legal or factual aspect of appeal.50 Similarly, 
the plenary of judges in Banda and Jerbo held that a blog post written by Judge Eboe-Osuji 
before his appointment to the ICC, in which he expressed an opinion on a situation before the 
Court, did not preclude him from later sitting on a case in that situation.51 The former decision 
seems reasonable given that, as President of the Tribunal at the time, Judge Song had a role in 
the external relations of the Court, pursuant to Article 38 of the Statute. Equally, given that 
judges are elected to the Court on the basis of either their expertise in international law or 
their experience in criminal law, it would be unreasonable to expect those experts in 
international law to never have publically commented on aspects of the ICC’s work. In the 
challenge to Judge Eboe-Osuji’s impartiality, the blog post in question discussed the 
relationship between the AUand the Court, and did not refer to the case at issue itself, nor did 
it express any bias against the accused. 
The Rome Statute provides the most advanced and thorough regime in order to ensure both 
independence and impartiality of its judiciary. It constitutes a dramatic improvement on the 
norms applicable to the ad hoc tribunals. In this respect, the limitation of judges to one term 
of office, and a clarification of both the grounds for dismissal and the body responsible for 
doing so constitute major improvements upon earlier models. 
 
48 ECtHR, Hauschildt v. Denmark, 10486/83,  24 May 1989, para. 46. 
49 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, AC, Judgment, IT-95-17/1-A, 21 July 2000, para. 189. 
50 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision of the Plenary of Judges on the Defence Application of 
20 February 2013 for the Disqualification of Judge Sang-Hyun Song from the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2981, 11 June 2013.  
51 ICC, Prosecutor v. Banda and Jerbo, Decision of the Plenary of the Judges on the ‘Defence Request for 
the Disqualification of a Judge’, ICC-02/05-03/09-344, 5 June 2012, para. 19. 
12 
 
f) ‘in full equality’ 
18 
The terms ‘in full equality’ are imported from Article 14(3) of the ICCPR. They complement 
the initial phrase of Article 14, ‘[a]ll persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals’ for 
which there is no equivalent in Article 67 of the Statute. Nevertheless, Article 21(1)of the 
Statute comprises a non-discrimination clause applicable to the instrument as a whole. In her 
dissenting opinion to a decision excusing the defendant Ruto from presence at his trial, Judge 
Herrera Carbuccia argued that this constituted a discrimination contrary to Article 21, on the 
basis of his status as Vice President of Kenya.52 
The guarantee of full equality before the ICC protects the accused against discriminatory 
practices and even vexatious prosecution where it appears to be motivated by discriminatory 
criteria. In the Čelebići case, the ICTY ACACconsidered the principle of equality before the 
law within the context of prosecutorial discretion. It said: 
 
 
‘This provision reflects the corresponding guarantee of equality before the law found in many 
international instruments, including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. All these 
instruments provide for a right to equality before the law, which is central to the principle of 
the due process of law. The provisions reflect a firmly established principle of international 
law of equality before the law, which encompasses the requirement that there should be no 
discrimination in the enforcement or application of the law. Thus 21 and the principle it 
embodies prohibits discrimination in the application of the law based on impermissible 
motives such as, inter alia, race, colour, religion, opinion, national or ethnic origin. The 
Prosecutor, in exercising her discretion under the Statute in the investigation and indictment 
of accused before the Tribunal, is subject to the principle of equality before the law and to this 
requirement of non-discrimination’.53 
 
 
The ACAC suggested that there would be a violation of equality before the law if ‘the 
decision to prosecute him or to continue his prosecution was based on impermissible motives, 
such as race or religion, and that the Prosecution failed to prosecute similarly situated 
defendants’.54 To show the Prosecutor is proceeding on a selective basis, ‘the evidence of 
discriminatory intent must be coupled with the evidence that the Prosecutor’s policy has a 
discriminatory effect, so that other similarly situated individuals of other ethnic or religious 
backgrounds were not prosecuted’.55 
An ICTY TC has suggested that the right to equality before the law might be violated in cases 
of plea-bargaining. For example, it mentioned the possibility that the Prosecutor might seek to 
make a plea agreement with some accused because of their knowledge of particular events 
which may be useful in prosecutions of other, more high ranking accused. The Prosecutor 
could make the terms of such a plea agreement quite generous in order to secure the co-
operation of that accused. ‘Other accused, who may not have been involved in the most 
 
52 ICC, Prosecutor v. Ruto, TC V, Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence 
at Trial, DissOp of Judge Herrera Carbuccia, ICC-01/09-01/11-777,18 June 2013. 
53 ICC, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., AC, Judgment, IT-96-21-A, 20 Feb. 2001, para. 605 (reference 
omitted). 
54 Ibid., para. 607. Also: ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana et al., TC I,  Judgment, ICTR-96-10 & 
ICTR-96-17-T, 21 Feb. 2003, paras. 870–871. 
55 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, AC, Judgment, ICTR-96-4-A, 1 June 2001, paras. 94–96. 
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egregious crimes or who may not have been part of a joint criminal enterprise with more high 
ranking accused, may not be offered such a generous plea agreement, or indeed any plea 
agreement’, said the decision.56 
2. Minimum guarantees 
a) Information about the charge 
19 
Article 67(1)(a)of the Statute complements similar provisions in Article 55(2)(a) protecting 
suspects during an investigation and at the time charges are confirmed, pursuant to Article 
61(3).57 It has been described as a rule of customary international law.58 The purpose of the 
norm is to provide an accused person with the information necessary for the preparation of a 
defence. The appropriate information required will depend on any questioning the accused has 
already undergone and on other circumstances of the case.59 But the accused may be expected 
to show some diligence in seeking information about the charge, for example by insisting 
upon attendance at the confirmation hearing.60 According to the AC, ‘the duty to act in a 
diligent and expeditious manner applies to all those involved in the proceedings, including the 
accused’.61 Two judges of the Court have said that ‘Article 67(1)(a) of the Statute and other 
provisions relating to notice of the charges … apply also during the pre-trial phase of 
proceedings and put emphasis on the level of detail of the information that must be 
provided’.62 The Pre-Trial Chamber’s confirmation decision must respect Article 67(1)so as 
to ‘ensure that the charges confirmed are sufficiently clear to be considered at trial’.63 
Convicted persons have raised issues about the formulation of the charges before the AC.64 
20 
Article 14 of the ICCPR refers only to the ‘nature and cause’ of the charge. The Statute goes 
further than the ICCPR and the other human rights models by requiring that this information 
also include the ‘content’ of the charge.65 According to the European Commission on Human 
 
56 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, TC, Sentencing Judgment, IT-02-60/1-S, 2 Dec. 2003, para. 66. 
57 Reg. 52 RegCindicates the information that must be included in the document containing the charges: 
‘The document containing the charges referred to in article 61 shall include: (a) The full name of the person and 
any other relevant identifying information; Regulations of the Court; (b) A statement of the facts, including the 
time and place of the alleged crimes, which provides a sufficient legal and factual basis to bring the person or 
persons to trial, including relevant facts for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court; (c) A legal characterisation 
of the facts to accord both with the crimes under articles 6, 7 or 8 and the precise form of participation under 
articles 25 and 28’. 
58  ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo et al., TC VII, Decision on the Submission of Auxiliary Documents, 
Partly DissOp of Judge Eboe-Osuji, ICC-01/05-01/13-992, 17 June 2015, para. 7. 
59 ECtHR, Mulosmani v. Albania, 29864/03, 8 Oct. 2013, para. 123; Kamasinski v. Austria, 9783/82, 
19 Dec. 1989, paras. 79–81. 
60 ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v. United Kingdom, 7819/77, 28 June 1984, para. 96. See Art. 61(2)(a) ICC 
Statute. 
61  ICC, Prosecutor v. Ongwen, AC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Dominic Ongwen against Trial 
Chamber IX’s ‘Decision on Defence Motions Alleging Defects in the Confirmation Decision’, ICC-02/04-01/15-
1562, 17 July 2019, para. 152. 
62  ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, AC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, DissOp of Judge Sanji Mmasenono 
Monageng and Judge Piotr Hofmański, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx1-Red, 8 June 2018, para. 36. 
63  ICC, Prosecutor v. Ongwen, TC IX, Decision on Defence Motions Alleging Defects in the 
Confirmation Decision, ICC-02/04-01/15-1476, 7 March 2019, para. 18. 
64  ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, AC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
against Trial Chamber III’s ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 tof the Statute’, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red, 8 Jun. 
2018, paras. 74-119; ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, AC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
against his conviction, ICC-01/04-01/06-3121, 1 Dec. 2014, paras. 114-137. 
65 At the Aug. 1996 session of the Preparatory Committee it was said that the ICCPR provision ‘needed 
further elaboration in the Statute’: see  PrepCom I 1996, para. 271, p. 58. 
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Rights, the ‘nature’ of the charge refers to the specific offence, while the ‘cause’ of the charge 
means the relevant material facts.66 There may be no meaningful distinction between ‘cause’ 
and ‘content’, except perhaps a message of exhaustivity.67 In practice, the European case law 
has not been very demanding, holding that the accused is entitled to material to enable 
preparation of a defence, ‘without however necessarily mentioning the evidence on which the 
charge is based’.68 However, in the ICC Statute this provision must be taken in combination 
with the very thorough disclosure requirements that are imposed upon the Prosecutor.69 Taken 
as a whole, these provisions indicate the desire of the Rome Conf. that the Prosecutor ensure 
that the accused is not taken by surprise during the proceedings, and that he or she benefits 
from a level of information going well beyond the thresholds set by domestic justice systems 
and endorsed by international human rights tribunals as being acceptable. 
Rule 121(3) of the RPE requires the Prosecutor to provide a detailed description of the 
charges within a reasonable time before the confirmation of charges hearing. Regulation 52 
RegC provides further detail on the required content of the document outlining the charges; 
this must include, inter alia, a statement of the facts which provides a sufficient legal and 
factual basis to bring the person to trial, and a legal characterisation of the facts to accord both 
with the crimes under Articles 6, 7, or 8 of the Statute, and the precise form of participation 
under Articles 25 and 28 of the Statute. In the Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui case, both 
defendants had been charged with co-perpetration under Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute. In 
2012, six months after the close of trial but before the judgment was issued, the TC opted to 
recharacterise the mode of liability that Katanga was charged with to common purpose 
liability under Article 25(3)(d)(ii).70 The decision raised concerns as regards the defendant’s 
ability to adequately prepare for trial and present his or her defence case, when a fundamental 
fact could be ‘recharacterised’ at such a late stage in proceedings.71 Nevertheless, the AC 
upheld this decision, finding that the TC could counteract any potential unfairness by taking 
measures to protect the rights of the accused.72 Perhaps as a consequence of this series of 
events, the Prosecutor moved towards charging alternative modes of liability in later 
decisions.73 
21 
The requirement that the information be ‘in a language which the accused fully understands 
and speaks’ develops Article 14(3)(a) of the ICCPR, which requires only that it be ‘in a 
language which [the accused] understands’. A proposal to refer to ‘his own language’ had 
 
66 ECommHumRts, Ofner v. Austria, 524/59, 23 Nov. 1962. See also: ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., 
TC,Decision on defence application for forwarding the documents in the language of the accused (Delalić), IT-
96- 21-T, 25 Sep. 1996, for determination on the types of materials to be made available to the accused in his or 
her language. 
67 See: AI,  Choices V (1997). 
68 ECommHumRts, X v. Belgium, 7628/76, DR 9, p. 172, cited in ECtHR, Acompora.v. Italy, 2072/08, 8 
Jan. 2013, para. 38; Previti v. Italy, 45291/06, 8 Dec. 2009,  para. 204. 
69 See Art. 61(3)(b); Art. 64(3)(c); Art. 67(2) ICC Statute.  
70 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, TC II, Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the 
Regulations of the Court and Severing the Charges against the Accused Persons, ICC-01/04-01/07-3319, 
21 Nov. 2012. The case was severed in this decision and Katanga’s co-accused was ultimately acquitted. 
71 See, inter alia, ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, TC II,, Decision on the Implementation of 
Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing the Charges against the Accused Persons, DissOp of 
Judge Christine van den Wyngaert, ICC-01/04-01/07-3319, 21 Nov. 2012; ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, TC II, 
Judgment, Minority Opinion of Judge Christine van den Wyngaert, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, 7 March 2014. 
72 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, AC,, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Germain Katanga against the decision 
of Trial Chamber II of 21 November 2012 entitled ‘Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the 
Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused persons”, ICC-01/04-01/07-3363, 
27 March 2013, para. 91. 
73 ICC, Prosecutor v. Blé Goudé, PTC, Decision on the ‘Defence request to amend the document 
containing the charges for lack of specificity’, ICC-02/11-02/11-143, 2 Sep. 2014. 
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beenleft in square brackets by the PrepCom,74 and was added at Rome. An amendment at the 
Rome Conf. contained the phrase ‘in his or her own language or in a language of his or her 
choice’.75 This prompted the Chair to propose: ‘in a language the accused understands or in 
his or her language’.76 The matter sparked considerable controversy. The provision that was 
finally adopted included a footnote: ‘It is understood that this expression means the language 
for which the accused, in good faith, has clearly expressed his or her preference’.77 To some 
degree, these are questionable improvements. The purpose served by requiring not only that 
the accused understand the language but also speak it seems unclear. Note that the ICCPR, in 
its general provision dealing with the right to an interpreter, presents this in the alternative: ‘if 
he cannot understand or speak the language used in court’. It was surely not the intention of 
the drafters of the Statute to provided disabled persons who are unable to speak with a pretext 
to avoid the jurisdiction of the Court. On the other hand, insisting on this detail helps to 
exclude some Strasbourg case law by which the norm is respected if the language is 
understood by the accused’s lawyer, and not necessarily by the accused personally.78 It goes 
without saying that the information must be provided at no cost to the defendant.79 
b) Time to prepare defence 
22 
This provision is modeled on Article 14(3)(b) of the ICCPR with the addition of the words 
‘freely’ and ‘in confidence’. It was introduced by the PrepCom at its Aug. 1997 session,80 and 
the text remained unchanged through to the final version adopted in Rome.81 
23 
Adequate time will depend on the circumstances of the case. Here the international case law is 
not particularly helpful, because it is a given that the types of cases to come before the ICC 
will be extraordinarily complex and therefore difficult to compare with the more mundane 
matters of domestic tribunals. The only relevant normative provision, again not particularly 
helpful, is Article 105 of the third Geneva Convention which specifies that counsel have ‘a 
period of two weeks at least before the opening of trial’. According to the ICTY, adequate 
time is a flexible concept that ‘begs of a definition outside the particular situation of each 
case. It is impossible to set a standard of what constitutes adequate time to prepare a defence 
because this is something which can be affected by a number of factors including the 
complexity of the case, and the competing forces and claims at play, such as consideration of 
the interests of other accused persons’.82 
24 
The word ‘facilities’ refers to ‘documents, records, etc. necessary for preparation of the 
defence’,83 a right that is complemented by the Statute‘s extensive disclosure obligations. 
 
74 See PrepCom Decisions Aug. 1997, p. 34; see Zutphen Draft, p. 114, Art. 60; ILC Draft Statute 1998, 
Art. 67, pp. 106–108. 
75 Proposal submitted by the Delegations of Egypt, Oman and the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.36 (29 June), p. 1. 
76 See Draft proposal for Art. 67. 
77 Report of the WG on Procedural Matters, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.2/Add.6 (11 July 
1998), pp. 3–4, fn. 5. 
78 ECommnHR, X. v. Austria, 6185/73, 29 May 1975, DR 2, p. 68. 
79 ECtHR, Luedicke, Belkacem and Koc v. Germany, 6210/73; 6877/75; 7132/75, 10 March 1980. That 
these services were free of charge was spelled out in one of the proposals submitted to the PrepCom: PrepCom II 
1996, p. 196. 
80 See PrepCom Decisions Aug. 1997, p. 34. 
81 See Zutphen Draft, p. 114; see Draft Statute 1998, p. 127; see Draft proposal for Art. 67; see Report of 
the WG on Procedural Matters (4 July), pp. 4–5; see Compendium of draft articles, pp. 41–42. 
82 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., TC, Decision on the applications for adjournment of the trial date, 
IT-96-21-T, 3 Feb. 1997. 
83 Schabas, CCPR Commentary (2019) 390.
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According to the ECommHumRts, this means the accused must have ‘the opportunity to 
organize his defence in an appropriate way and without restriction as to the possibility to put 
all relevant defence arguments before the trial court’.84 In the Kenya situation, it was held that 
pursuant to Article 93(1) of the Statute, states parties were obliged to comply with requests 
for assistance made by the prosecution in relation to investigations and prosecutions.85 
Pursuant to the equality of arms principle, it would stand to reason that the same compliance 
obligations apply to defence requests for documents or other materials necessary for the 
preparation of the defence case. 
With respect to communication with counsel, the addition of the words ‘freely’ and ‘in 
confidence’ underscore the privileged nature of the communication and the fact that it must be 
undertaken in secure premises not subject to eavesdropping by the authorities.86 Access to 
communication by the accused must be both in person and in writing. The PrepCom 
considered that the question of privileged communication should not be dealt with in the 
provision on rights of the accused.87 Rule 73 of the RPE expressly recognizes the privileged 
nature of lawyer-client communications. Although it is not explicitly listed as an exception in 
Rule 73, the Court has held that the right to free and confidential communication with counsel 
is forfeited ‘whenever an accused uses such right with a view to furthering a criminal scheme, 
rather than to obtaining legal advice’, such as where the lawyer is alleged to have been 
involved in interfering with witnesses.88 
c) Trial without undue delay 
25 
The provision is identical to that of its model in the ICCPR. During the PrepCom sessions, 
‘[t]he point was also made that an expeditious trial process would prevent a guilty person 
from delaying the proceedings and would secure the early release of an innocent person. What 
was needed in this regard was a proactive court which would properly manage the case so as 
to achieve an early resolution of the case’.89 Here, too, there were attempts to ‘improve’ the 
ICCPR text, with suggestions that ‘undue’ be replaced with ‘unreasonable’ and that the right 
‘to enjoy a speedy trial’ be added.90 But at Rome, on a proposal from the Chair of the WG, the 
ICCPR text was retained.91 
‘Expeditiousness forms an integral part of a fair trial’, according to the AC.92 But it is also 
‘beneficial to victims and witnesses, and unreasonable delay may also diminish public interest 
 
84 ECtHR, Rook v. Germany, 1586/15, 25 July 2019, para. 56; ECtHR, Mayzit v. Russia, 63378/00, 20 Jan. 
2005, para 78; Can v. Austria, Ser. A, No. 96, 30 Sep. 1985, Commission Report, para. 53. 
85 ICC, Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, TC V, Decision on Prosecution’s applications for a finding of non-
compliance pursuant to Article 87(7) and for an adjournment of the provisional trial date, ICC-01/09-02/11-908, 
31 March 2014. 
86 See Art. 69(5), which indicates that this is a question for the Rules. In the travaux, see  PrepCom II 
1996, pp. 196–197; see Zutphen Draft, p. 114, fn. 203; see Draft Statute 1998, p. 127, fn. 11. The Rules of the ad 
hoc Tribunals expressly recognize lawyer-client privilege. The U.S.A. proposed a draft set of rules of evidence 
for the Court containing a provision ensuring lawyer-client privilege: Reference Paper Submitted by the U.S.A., 
UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.21, p. 7, rule 10. 
87 See PrepCom Decisions Aug. 1997, p. 34, fn. 48. 
88 ICC, Situation in Central African Republic, PTC II, Decision on the Prosecutor’s ‘Request for judicial 
order to obtain evidence for investigation under Article 70’, ICC-01/05-52-Red2, 3 Feb. 2014. 
89 See PrepCom I 1996, p. 58, para. 271. 
90 See PrepCom II 1996, p. 197; see PrepCom Decisions Aug. 1997, p. 34; see Zutphen Draft, p. 114; see 
Draft Statute 1998, p. 127. Also, at the Rome Conf., see Proposal submitted by the Delegations of Egypt, Oman 
and the Syrian Arab Republic, p. 1. 
91 See Draft proposal for Art. 67; see Report of the WG on Procedural Matters (4 July), pp. 4–5; see 
Compendium of draft articles, pp. 41–42. 
92  Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15-1562, para. 137. Also ICC, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo et al., AC, Judgment on 
the appeals of Mr Laurent Gbagbo and Mr Charles Blé Goudé against the decision of Trial Chamber I of 9 June 
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and public support for, and cooperation with the Court’,93 In that sense, expeditiousness is ‘an 
independent and important value in the Statute to ensure the proper administration of justice, 
and is therefore more than just a component of the fair trial rights of the accused’.94 
26 
Case law and academic comment on the ICCPR provision have considered that the time limit 
begins to run at the moment the suspect or the accused is informed that the authorities are 
taking steps towards prosecution. The period ends with a definitive decision.95 What this 
means specifically will depend on each individual case. In one case, the HRC considered the 
provision had been violated by Canada when the preparation of trial transcripts took twenty-
nine months resulting in a three-year delay for an appeal hearing.96 In another, the Committee 
found that the period from the filing of the final appeal brief until the judgment, of 32 months, 
was too long.97 In Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, a delay of forty-five months between 
dismissal of an appeal and delivery of a written judgment was held to violate the norm98. The 
Nuremberg trial of the major war criminals set an awesome precedent that the ad hoc 
Tribunals have been unable even to approach. By domestic standards, today’s international 
justice is an incredibly protracted affair. The AC of the ICTR has considered that inexcusable 
delay attributable to the Prosecutor, in extreme circumstances, entitles the accused to have the 
charges dropped ‘with prejudice’ to the Prosecutor, that is, without the possibility of retrial.99 
The ICC has refused an application for an ‘indefinite adjournment’ of a case where the 
Prosecutor had insufficient evidence to proceed to trial, and could not provide a date on which 
she would be ready. She said this was owing to difficulties in obtaining evidence from an 
uncooperative state.100 TC V ordered the Prosecutor to either declare that she was ready to 
continue to trial, or to withdraw the charges against the accused. The charges were dropped, 
without prejudice, a short time later.101 
In its Court Capacity Model, the ICC set out optimistic assessments of the length of 
proceedings, projecting an average trial to last slightly less than three years from arrest until 
final judgment, apportioning three months for the confirmation of charges, six months for 
disclosure and preparation for trial, fifteen months for the trial itself and finally nine months 
for the appeal.102 The trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the first completed trial before the 
Court, lasted somewhat longer, at over eight years from arrest to appeal judgment. The trial of 
Germain Katanga, which was not appealed by either side, lasted almost seven years from 
arrest to judgment. The trial of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo lasted ten years from arrest to his 
acquittal on appeal. 
d) Rights of the defence 
27 
 
2016 entitled ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s application to introduce prior recorded testimony under Rules 
68(2)(b) and 68(3)’, ICC-02/11-01/15-744, 1 Nov. 2016, para. 59. 
93  Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15-1562, para. 137. 
94  Katanga et al., ICC-01/04-01/07-2259, para. 47 
95 Schabas, CCPR Commentary (2019) 392-393.  
96 HRC, Pinkney v. Canada, 27/1978, UN Doc. CCPR/3/Add.1, 29 Oct. 1981, Vol. II,  385, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/1,  95, 2 HRLJ 344. 
97  HRC, Rouse v. Philippines, 1089/2002, 25 July 2005, para. 7.4. 
98 HRC, Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, 210/1986, 225/1987, UN Doc. A/44/40, 6 April 1989, 222, 11 
HRLJ 150. 
99 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, AC, ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decisions of 3 Nov. 1999 and 31 March 
2000. 
100 ICC, Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, TC V, Decision on Prosecution’s application for a further adjournment, 
ICC-01/09-02/11-981, 3 Dec. 2014. 
101 ICC, Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Notice of withdrawal of the charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-
01/09-02/11-983, 5 Dec. 2014. 
102 Report on the Court Capacity Model, Document ICC-ASP/5/10, para. 23. 
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Article 67(1)(d) of the Statute substantially reflects the content of Article 14(3)(d) of the 
ICCPR, subject to a number of minor drafting changes. The text is little changed from the ILC 
Draft. It was approved by the WG at the August 1997 PrepCom103 and was adopted at Rome 
without change.104 
aa) Presence at trial 
28 
The right to be present at trial is made subject to Article 63(2), which permits the trial to 
proceed in the absence of an accused who is disruptive. Exceptions exist within the Statute 
and the RPE for ex parte hearings under very specific circumstances. Article 72(7) of the 
Statute allows for a hearing concerning the protection of national security information to take 
place ex parte, that is, in the absence of one or both of the parties. Ex parte proceedings 
during the trial phase are also authorised under the RPE. The TC may hear the Prosecutor ex 
parte in order to determine whether an assurance may be given to a witness who may make 
testify in such a way as to incriminate himself or herself.105 A TC may also sit ex parte to 
consider whether or not to authorise special measures to facilitate testimony of a traumatized 
victim or witness, a child, an elderly person or a victim of sexual violence.106 
The ICC has had to grapple with the question of whether it would be appropriate to allow an 
accused to be absent from trial, at his or her own request. Although Article 63(1) of the 
Statute uses the words ‘shall be present during the trial’, indicating that the presence of the 
accused is an obligation as well as a right, the Court has been quite flexible on this question. 
The continuation of the trial for short durations in the absence of the accused has been 
permitted where the accused specifically waived their right to be present.107 As Judges 
Kouroula and Ušacka have noted: 
 
‘Absence from particular hearings or parts of hearings may be considered to be so 
insignificant that they do not amount to a violation of the fundamental requirement of 
presence… However, the practical difficulties that may be encountered in enforcing the 
requirement established in article 63 (1) of the Statute to the strict letter of the law should not 
be used as a justification for interpreting article 63 (1) of the Statute so that it is found to 
provide the Trial Chamber with a general discretion to excuse an accused from presence at 
trial.’108 
 
The Court has also had to rule upon requests for more continuous absence from proceedings, 
where the defendants’ official functions mandate their presence in their home state. TC V(a) 
initially excused the defendant Ruto, Deputy President of Kenya, from attending all of the 
trial with the exception of the opening and closing statements, the presentation in person of 
 
103 See 1996 PrepCom Decisions Aug. 1997, pp. 34–35. 
104 See Zutphen Draft, p. 114; see Draft Statute 1998, p. 117; see Draft proposal for Art. 67; see Report of 
the WG on Procedural Matters (4 July), pp. 4–5; Report of the WG on Procedural Matters, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.2/Add.8 (15 July), p. 6; see Compendium of draft articles, pp. 41–42. 
105 Rule 74(4) RPE. 
106 Rule 88(2) RPE. 
107 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Transcript, ICC-01/04-0 l/06-T-172-Red3-ENG, 12 May 2009, pp. 1–2; 
ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Transcript, ICC-01/05-01/08-T-183-Red-ENG, 7 Nov. 2011, pp. 1–2; ICC, 
Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Transcript, ICC-01/05- 01/08-T-306-Red-ENG, 12 April 2013, p. 62; ICC, 
Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Transcript, ICC-01/05-01/08-T-324-ENG, 17 June 2013, pp. 16–17; ICC, 
Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Transcript, ICC-01/05-01/08-T-331-CONF-ENG, 27 June 2013, pp 2–3. 
108 ICC, Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, AC, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision 
of Trial Chamber V(a) of 18 June 2013 entitled ‘Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous 
Presence at Trial’, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge Erkki Kourula and Judge Anita Ušacka, ICC-01/09-01/11-
1066-Anx, 25 Oct. 2013. 
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the views and concerns of victims, the delivery of judgment, and, if applicable, the sentencing 
hearings, the sentencing, the victim impact hearings, the reparation hearings, and any other 
attendance directed by the Chamber, at his own request.109 The AC partially overturned that 
ruling, setting down the following conditions for the absence of the accused: 
• (i) the absence of the accused can only take place in exceptional circumstances and must 
not become the rule; 
• (ii) the possibility of alternative measures must have been considered, including, 
but not limited to, changes to the trial schedule or a short adjournment of the trial; 
• (iii) any absence must be limited to that which is strictly necessary; 
• (iv) the accused must have explicitly waived his or her right to be present at trial; 
• (v) the rights of the accused must be fully ensured in his or her absence, in 
particular through representation by counsel; and 
• (vi) the decision as to whether the accused may be excused from attending part of 
his or her trial must be taken on a case-by-case basis, with due regard to the subject 
matter of the specific hearings that the accused would not attend.110 
In an amendment to the RPE agreed in 2013, the ASP adopted the new Rules 134bis and 
134ter, which permit an accused to make a request in writing to be present through the use of 
video-link technology only, or to be excused and to be represented by counsel only during 
part of his or her trial, and provides some guidance for the TC in granting this request. The 
new Rule 134quater relates exclusively to those accused persons who are ‘mandated to fulfill 
extraordinary public duties at the highest national level’. The TC shall grant the request for 
excusal from trial where it is convinced that it is in the interests of justice and not prejudicial 
to the rights of the accused.111 
Article 76(4) of the Statute seems to imply that the presence of the accused when sentence is 
imposed is not indispensable, because it says this should take place ‘wherever possible’. The 
curious phrase was introduced when the PrepCom was considering the possibility of in 
absentia trials, and remained in the final version of the Statute, although the concept of in 
absentia trials had been abandoned, without any thought being given to the matter.112 Thus, 
Article 76(4) should not be seen as an attenuation of the principle of presence of the accused 
at trial. 
bb) Defend oneself in person 
29 
The accused is entitled to defend himself or herself in person. The most celebrated example of 
this situation took place during the prosecution of Slobodan Milošević before the ICTY. In an 
initial challenge to the accused’s insistence on defending himself, the Prosecutor invoked the 
fragile medical condition of the defendant. Presiding Judge Richard May wrote: ‘A plain 
reading of this provision indicates that there is a right to defend oneself in person and the TC 
is unable to accept the Prosecution’s proposition that it would allow for the assignment of 
defence counsel for the Accused against his wishes in the present circumstances’.113 Judge 
May noted that the right to defend oneself was especially important in the essentially 
 
109 ICC, Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, AC, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision 
of Trial Chamber V(a) of 18 June 2013 entitled ‘Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous 
Presence at Trial’, ICC-01/09-01/11-1066, 25 Oct. 2013. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Res. ICC-ASP/12/Res.7, Adopted at the 12th plenary meeting on 27 Nov. 2013 by consensus. 
112 See Report of the WG on Procedural Matters (15 July), p. 10. In this respect, there is an error in Report 
of the Drafting Committee to the Committee of the Whole, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.88 (16 July), p. 14, 
which states that the Committee of the Whole adopted the following: ‘The sentence shall be pronounced in 
public and in the presence of the accused’, without the words ‘whenever possible’. 
113 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, TC,Reasons for Decision on the Prosecution Motion Concerning 
Assignment of Counsel, IT-02-54-T, 4 April 2003, para. 18. 
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adversarial-type proceedings of the ICTY. Here he referred to a relevant decision of the 
SCOTUS, which held that ‘forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his 
basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so’.114 As Judge May explained: 
 
‘There is a further practical reason for the right to self-representation in common law. While it 
may be the case that in civil law systems it is appropriate to appoint defence counsel for an 
accused who wishes to represent himself, in such systems the court is fulfilling a more 
investigative role in an attempt to establish the truth. In the adversarial systems, it is the 
responsibility of the parties to put forward the case and not for the court, whose function it is 
to judge. Therefore, in an adversarial system, the imposition of defence counsel on an 
unwilling accused would effectively deprive that accused of the possibility of putting forward 
a defence. In this connection, article 21 (4) (d) of the Statute may be said to be reflective of 
the common law position’.115 
 
 another case involving an obstreperous defendant, another TC of the ICTY signalled the 
difference in approach between common law and ‘civil law” systems, noting that international 
human rights case law acknowledged that the right to defend oneself was subject to 
limitations. It also observed that ‘[t]he Accused is in fact increasingly demonstrating a 
tendency to act in an obstructionist fashion while at the same time revealing a need for legal 
assistance’. Consequently, the TC ordered the appointment of ‘standby counsel’, who would 
be mandated to assist the accused, and ‘in exceptional circumstances to take over the defence 
from the Accused at trial should the TC find, following a warning, that the Accused is 
engaging in disruptive conduct or conduct requiring his removal from the courtroom’.116 
Subsequently, the TC attempted to impose counsel on Šešelj, who went on a hunger strike in 
protest. After he had been without food for many days, the AC overruled the TC.117 
After Judge May withdrew from the Milošević case because of a serious illness of his own, his 
two colleagues, together with the new judge appointed in his place, and inspired by the Šešelj 
ruling of the other TC, revised their earlier decision. Noting the ongoing medical problems of 
the accused, which had occasioned several adjournments in the course of the two and half 
years of hearings, the TC said: ‘If at any stage of a trial there is a real prospect that it will be 
disrupted and the integrity of the trial undermined with the risk that it will not be conducted 
fairly, then the TC has a duty to put in place a regime which will avoid that. Should self-
representation have that impact, we conclude that it is open to the TC to assign counsel to 
conduct the defence case, if the Accused will not appoint his own counsel’.118 The TC said it 
‘was of the opinion that it was necessary to relieve the Accused of the burden of conducting 
his own case with a view to stabilising his health to ensure, so far as possible, that the trial 
proceeds with the minimum of interruption in a way that will permit the orderly presentation 
of the Accused’s case and the completion of the trial within a reasonable time in his interests 
and the interests of justice: in other words, to secure for the Accused a fair and expeditious 
trial’.119 
 
114 SCOTUS, Faretta v. California, 422 US 806, 817, 30 June 1975. 
115 Milošević, IT-02-54-T, 4 Apr. 2003, para. 24. 
116 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Šešelj, TC, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to 
Assist Vojislav Šešelj With his Defence, IT-03-67-PT, 9 May 2003. 
117 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Šešelj, AC, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on 
Assignment of Counsel, IT-03-67-AR73.3, 20 Oct. 2006. 
118 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, TC, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, IT-02-
54-T, 22 Sep. 2004, para. 33. See also Prosecutor v. Milošević, TC, Order on Future Conduct of the Trial, IT-02-
54-T, 6 July 2004. 
119 Ibid., para. 66. 
21 
 
The ‘assigned counsel’ appealed the decision, which was reversed, in part, by the AC. The 
AC stated that the right of an accused person to defend himself or herself could indeed be 
curtailed on the grounds that a defendant’s self-representation is substantially and persistently 
obstructing the proper and expeditious conduct of his trial. It reasoned by analogy with the 
right to be tried in one’s own presence, which the Tribunal noted was subject to limitation in 
the event of disruption. ‘If a defendant’s right to be present for his trial – which, to reiterate, is 
listed in the same string of rights and indeed in the same clause as the right to self-
representation – may thus be restricted on the basis of substantial trial disruption, the AC sees 
no reason to treat the right to self-representation any differently’, it said.120 In the case of 
disruption, the accused can be said to have consciously and intentionally waived the right to 
be present at trial, and to act in his or her own defence. The AC said that ‘it cannot be that the 
only kind of disruption legitimately cognizable by a TC is the intentional variety. How should 
the Tribunal treat a defendant whose health, while good enough to engage in the ordinary and 
non-strenuous activities of everyday life, is not sufficiently robust to withstand all the rigours 
of trial work – the late nights, the stressful cross-examinations, the courtroom confrontations – 
unless the hearing schedule is reduced to one day a week, or even one day a month’?121 
The TC of the SCSL has also considered the question of self-representation.122 Referring to 
the formulation of the right of self-representation, the SCSL TC said that because Article 
17(4)(d) of the Court’s Statute spoke of ‘the right to have legal assistance assigned’, this 
proved that ‘the right to defend himself or herself in person’ was only a qualified and not an 
absolute right. Unlike Milošević, the SCSL defendant, Hinga Norman, had no apparent 
medical problems, nor was he misbehaving in court. The judges simply felt he wasn’t up to 
the job of defending himself, adding that the problems this might cause would also impact 
negatively on the right of the other two defendants in the case to a speedy trial.123 Finally, the 
judges laid emphasis on the ‘time limited mandate of the Court’,124 a reference to the 
parsimonious resources allocated by the UN. The TC concluded with an oxymoron, writing 
that ‘[t]he right to self-representation in this case … can only be exercised with the assistance 
of Counsel’.125 
The RPE of the ICC do not contemplate this situation, probably because the issues had not yet 
arisen before the ad hoc tribunals when the Rules were drafted. No clear formula has yet 
emerged at the ad hoc tribunals, where the approach sometimes seems rather improvised. 
Even where the fundamental justification for setting aside the right to self-representation is 
expediency, it is doubtful whether such a result is in fact achieved. 
cc) Choice of counsel 
30 
Although the accused is entitled to choice of counsel, this right cannot be unlimited. The 
Court may impose ethical, linguistic and other professional requirements in order to establish 
qualifications for counsel, as under domestic legal systems. The European Convention organs 
have dismissed claims alleging a violation of the right to counsel on the basis of failure to 
 
120 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, AC, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision 
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Trial Proceedings, SCSL-04-14-PT, 1 Oct. 2004, para. 23. 
123 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Norman et al., TC, Decision on the Application of Sam Hinga Norman for Self-
Representation Under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special Court, SCSL-04-14-PT, 8 June 2004. 
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respect professional ethics,126 where counsel was also a defence witness,127 and even for a 
refusal to wear a gown.128 There is no right to choice of counsel when a defendant relies upon 
legal aid. According to the ICTR AC, ‘in the light of a textual and systematic interpretation of 
the provisions of the Statute and the Rules, read in conjunction with relevant decisions from 
the HRC and the organs of the ECHR, that the right to free legal assistance by counsel does 
not confer the right to choose one’s counsel’.129 Nevertheless, the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals has been to accommodate representation by counsel chosen by the accused, where 
feasible, and this approach is reflected in the RegC: 
 
‘Regulation 75 Choice of defence counsel 
1. If the person entitled to legal assistance chooses a counsel included in the list of counsel, 
the Registrar shall contact that counsel. If the counsel is willing and ready to represent 
the person, the Registrar shall facilitate the issuance of a power of attorney for this 
counsel by the person. 
2. If the person entitled to legal assistance chooses a counsel not on the list of counsel who 
is willing and ready to represent him or her and to be included in the list, the Registrar 
shall decide on the eligibility of that counsel in accordance with regulation 70 and, upon 
inclusion in the list, shall facilitate the issuance of a power of attorney. Until the filing of 
a power of attorney, the person entitled to legal assistance may be represented by duty 
counsel in accordance with regulation 73’. 
 
The classic problem in domestic legal systems concerning choice of counsel on legal aid is the 
low tariff, in effect discouraging more senior and expert lawyers from agreeing to take such 
cases. Remuneration at the international tribunals is however sufficient to attract top notch 
professionals. 
The ad hoc Tribunals have adopted a rule requiring that counsel be either admitted to the 
practice of law in a State or be a university professor of law.130 The RPE of the ICC are 
somewhat different, and focus on substance rather than form, requiring that ‘counsel for the 
defence shall have established competence in international or criminal law and procedure, as 
well as the necessary relevant experience, whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other 
similar capacity, in criminal proceedings’. Counsel must have a minimum of ten years of 
relevant experience, and shall not have been convicted of ‘a serious criminal or disciplinary 
offence considered to be incompatible with the nature of the office of counsel before the 
Court’.131 Defence counsel must also have ‘an excellent knowledge of and be fluent in at least 
one of the working languages of the Court’.132 In the Darfur Situation, the PTC instructed the 
Registrar to appoint ad hoc counsel for the defence who was not only fluent in one of the 
working languages, but who was also capable of working in Arabic.133 The Registrar may 
remove lawyers from the list of counsel for various disciplinary factors.134 
 
126 ECommnHR, Ensslin, Baader and Raspe v. Federal Republic of Germany, 7572/76, 7586/76 and 
7587/76, 8 July 1978, .DR 14, p. 91. 
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The Statute and the RPE establish norms that apply to defence counsel, including a Code of 
Professional Conduct for Counsel to be adopted by the ASP pursuant to a proposal from the 
Registrar, following consultation with the Prosecutor.135 
31 
The accused is entitled to be informed of the right to counsel. In practice, this is unlikely to 
pose any problem. 
dd) Free legal assistance 
32 
In the ICCPR, the right to funded counsel for indigent defendants is subject to the requirement 
that this be in cases ‘where the interests of justice so require’. Arguably, this will be the 
situation in all cases before the ICC. Indeed, the ILC removed the condition in its Draft 
Statute,136 only to have it introduced again by the PrepCom.137 Consequently, the rule is not 
an absolute one, although it is hard to imagine an example of a matter before the Court where 
the interests of justice would not require funded counsel for an indigent defendant 
33 
The most far-reaching discussion of this provision took place in the informal WG at the Aug. 
1996 session of the PrepCom. There, a number of practical recommendations were made, 
closely following the practice of the ad hoc tribunals.138 A detailed codification of principles 
governing the appointment of counsel was also set out at that time.139 
34 
Administration of the system of legal aid to indigent defendants is the responsibility of the 
Registrar.140 Legal aid is to encompass all that is necessary for ‘effective and efficient 
defence, including the remuneration of counsel’.141 The right to counsel includes a right to 
adequate, qualified counsel. Unlike situations where a defendant chooses and remunerates 
counsel, when counsel are authorized and funded by the Court, it becomes responsible for 
their competence.142 The Registrar is afforded a wide margin of discretion when decisions on 
legal aid are challenged before the Court, and it has been held that a Chamber should only 
interfere ‘if there are compelling reasons for doing so’.143 This includes circumstances where 
the Registrar has failed to provide full and complete justification for his or her decision, or 
where the decision evinces signs of arbitrariness or a misuse of the Registrar’s discretion.144 
The experience of the ad hoc Tribunals shows that it is likely that counsel will be remunerated 
by the Tribunal in virtually all cases, given the fact that defendants, even if they were once 
powerful rulers who looted their countries before losing power, become suddenly and 
mysteriously impoverished at the time of indictment. The first defendant to come before the 
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Court, Thomas Lubanga, was declared indigent and provided with Court-appointed 
counsel145. The RegC indicate the criteria for determining eligibility for legal aid.146 
35 
Legal assistance before the ad hoc Tribunals has had a turbulent history, and practice appears 
to differ between The Hague and Arusha. David Tolbert, who has worked in several senior 
positions with the ICTY over the years, describes the defence counsel and legal aid systems as 
‘the ICTY’s Achilles’ heel’.147 In one case before the ICTY, a defendant who had benefitted 
from legal aid was ordered to reimburse the Tribunal, where it was later found that he had 
sufficient funds to pay for his own defence.148 
e) Right to challenge evidence and raise defences 
36 
The first sentence of Article 67(1)(e) is virtually identical, aside from the changes to gender 
neutral terminology, to the text of Article 14(3)(e) of the ICCPR. The second sentence, 
dealing with entitlement to raise defences, is an original contribution. 
aa) Examination of witnesses 
37 
The ILC attempted to rewrite somewhat the ICCPR provision dealing with examination of 
witnesses, limiting the application of the right to prosecution witnesses, and thereby 
eliminating witnesses called by the Court on its own motion from the scope of the 
provision149. The PrepCom adopted the language of the ILC150 but the Rome Conf., in its 
wisdom, returned to the original ICCPR text.151 According to Judge Vohrah, of the ICTY: 
 
The principle is intended in an ordinary trial to ensure that the Defence has means to prepare 
and present its case equal to those available to the Prosecution which has all the advantages of 
the State on its side … [T]he European Commission of Human Rights equates the principle of 
equality of arms with the right of the accused to have procedural equality with the 
Prosecution.152 
 
38 
It is foreseeable that there be certain limits to this right. The formal provisions governing 
testimony of victims of sexual crimes is an example. Article 68(2) enables the Court to allow 
the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means. Of course, this is not a 
breach of Article 67(1)(e) unless it is read as including a right to cross-examination and to 
confrontation. 
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During the PrepCom sessions, the issue was presented as a right to ‘confront and cross-
examine all witnesses’.153 But the wording of the provision is based on an international model 
which recognizes the legitimacy of trials without confrontation of witnesses and cross-
examination, at least in the sense of common law procedure.154 Article 14 of the ICCPR was 
not intended to impose a common law model on domestic justice systems, and those which do 
not indulge in cross-examination of witnesses before the Court cannot be considered, prima 
facie, to be in breach of the international norm. Thus, although the defence has the right to 
examine witnesses on the same basis as the Prosecutor, there is no explicit provision for a full 
right to cross-examination, as it is understood in the common law. The Regulations further 
confirm this perspective: 
 
‘Subject to the Statute and the Rules, the Presiding Judge, in consultation with the other 
members of the Chamber, shall determine the mode and order of questioning witnesses and 
presenting evidence so as to: 
• (a) Make the questioning of witnesses and the presentation of evidence fair and 
effective for the determination of the truth…’.155 
 
Under continental or Romano-Germanic legal systems, questions may be posed by the judge 
at the request of counsel. At trial, under Article 64(8)(b), the presiding judge may issue 
directions as to the conduct of the proceedings, failing which the Prosecutor and the defence 
are to agree on the order and the manner in which evidence is to be presented.156 Witnesses 
are questioned by the party that presents them, followed by questioning by the other party and 
by the Court. The defence has the right to be the last to examine a witness.157 
Nothing in the Statute provides for compellability of witnesses, for example by issuance of 
subpoenae or similar orders to appear before the Court. In 2014, the Court was held had the 
power to summon witnesses to appear, and to oblige State parties to serve such summonses 
and compel the attendance of witnesses.158 
There are limits to the right to examine witnesses. The formal provisions governing the 
testimony of victims of sexual crimes are an example. In such circumstances, Article 68(2) 
authorises the Court to allow the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special 
means. Some questions are out of bounds: the RPE state that evidence of the prior or 
subsequent sexual conduct of a victim or witness is not to be admitted.159 It may also disallow 
questions because they are abusive or repetitive. What is important is that the parties, 
prosecution and defence, be treated equally and that the trial be fundamentally fair. The 
Statute also allows the Court to recognise witness privileges. The ASP agreed to confirm a 
principle already recognised by the ICTY, by which the ICRC has a right to non-disclosure of 
evidence obtained by a former employee in the course of official duties. The Tribunal relied 
on customary international law in reaching its decision.160 The Rules also recognise solicitor 
client privilege, and enable the Court to extend privilege to other categories of witnesses.161 It 
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has been suggested that on this basis privilege might be extended to other non- governmental 
organisations with humanitarian purposes, and bodies such as a truth and reconciliation 
commission. 
bb) Defences 
39 
The second sentence of subpara. (e) recognizes the right of the accused to raise defences and 
to present other admissible evidence. The PrepCom had appended to the provision, in square 
brackets, a sentence stating: ‘In addition the accused shall also be entitled to present any other 
evidence’.162 At Rome, the Chair of the WG added the reference to raising defences.163 
40 
These rights must surely be included within the general principle of the right to a fair trial, 
established in the chapeau of Article 67(1). Moreover, defences are described in considerable 
detail in Part 2 of the Statute, concerning general principles of law. It should be observed that 
some defences are formally excluded by Articles 27, 28, and 33, namely the defence of 
official capacity, lack of knowledge (in the case of command responsibility) and superior 
orders (in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity). 
f) Interpreter 
41 
The provision in the ICC Statute is considerably more detailed than the corresponding text in 
the ICCPR although it is doubtful whether anything really new has been added. 
Article 14(3)(f) recognizes the right to ‘free assistance of an interpreter’ if the accused ‘cannot 
understand or speak the language used in court’.164 Here, too, the ILC attempted to improve 
on the text of the ICCPR, adding the requirement that the interpreter be ‘competent’, 
specifying extension of the principle to include documents, and modifying the requirement 
that the accused either understand or speak the language to become a cumulative requirement, 
‘understands and speaks’.165 The Statute provision is essentially identical to the ILC Draft, 
except for the order of the phrases. These were reversed at the Aug. 1997 session of the 
PrepCom,166 and the word ‘fully’ added during the Rome Conf.167 
42 
An accused who does not understand the proceedings is not ‘present’ at trial. Thus, the right 
to an interpreter seems axiomatic. Supervision of the quality of such interpretation is a 
constant difficulty, however, because frequently the accused is the only person who is actually 
listening to the interpretation. Although the requirement that documents be translated may be 
cumbersome, time-consuming and costly, it has been recognized by the ECtHR as a corollary 
of the right to an interpreter.168 
43 
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The provision does not require interpretation into the accused’s mother tongue, or into a 
language of the accused’s choice.169 In an interlocutory ruling, the ICTY denied an accused’s 
request for a ‘Croatian’ interpreter, given that the languages are similar enough and there was 
regular translation of Serbo-Croatian.170 The accused is not entitled to a translation of every 
document in the case; the right extends only to ‘such translations as are necessary to meet the 
requirements of fairness’. The Court has taken quite a restrictive approach to translation, 
holding that only those documents that are fundamental to ensuring that the accused fully 
understands the ‘nature, cause and content of the charge and thus to adequately defend 
himself or herself’ must be translated.171 A more expansive approach to interpretation might 
be required where the accused opts to exercise his or her right to self-representation, as the 
ability to prepare an effective defence will likely extend to a wider range of documents. 
g) Right to silence 
44 
The right to silence provision is also based on the norm in Article 14(3) of the ICCPR, but 
goes considerably farther. The ICCPR says that an accused has the right ‘[n]ot to be 
compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt’. The Statute removes the qualification 
‘against himself’, and adds an additional norm that is not at all implicit in the ICCPR, namely 
that the silence of an accused cannot be a consideration in the determination of guilt or 
innocence. 
45 
The words ‘against himself’ were removed by the ILC in its Draft Statute, but otherwise the 
text of Article 14(3)(g) remained intact.172 But this is not the same as the general right against 
self-incrimination found in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because 
the right may only be invoked by an accused.173 The text clarifies the fact that an accused may 
refuse to testify altogether, and not merely to testify when the evidence is ‘against himself’. 
46 
The second arm of the provision, providing that silence includes the right not to have it 
invoked against an accused, was added during the Aug. 1997 PrepCom.174 Without square 
brackets, it sailed along effortlessly into the final version of the Statute,175 although at the 
Rome Conf. the UK made an interesting proposal that changed the form without modifying 
the content.176 The provision reflects concerns with encroachments upon the right to silence in 
some national justice systems. Specifically, English common law has always prevented any 
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adverse inference being drawn from an accused’s failure to testify. But in recent years, 
legislation adopted within the UK now allows prosecutors to propose such conclusions.177 
At the ad hoc tribunals, the right to silence has arisen in proceedings concerning provisional 
release, where prosecutors argued that the silence of the accused is a pejorative factor 
militating against release. But TC have said that ‘lack of co-operation of an accused should 
not, as a rule, be taken into consideration as a factor’ that might justify denying an application 
for provisional release. According to an ICTY TC, ‘[t]he alternative would easily result in 
infringement of the fundamental right of an accused to remain silent’.178 
Cooperation with the Prosecutor may be cited as a mitigating factor at the sentencing stage, 
and to this extent there may be a price to be paid by an accused for exercising the right to 
silence. However, TC have frequently insisted that the fact the accused does not plead guilty 
should not be viewed as an aggravating factor, ‘since an accused person has no obligation to 
do so and he has the right to remain silent should he choose that course’.179 In Niyitegeka, an 
ICTR TC wrote: 
 
‘The Accused chose not to testify in his own defence in the present case. The Defence made 
submissions concerning the right to remain silent and the right not to testify. The Chamber is 
mindful of the Accused’s rights in this regard and has not drawn any adverse inference in the 
present case.’180 
 
In Čelebići, the ICTY AC said there is ‘an absolute prohibition against consideration of 
silence in the determination of guilt or innocence is guaranteed within the Statute and the 
Rules… Similarly, this absolute prohibition must extend to an inference being drawn in the 
determination of sentence’.181 While the ICC has confirmed that no adverse inference may be 
drawn from the accused’s silence, it has also held that if the accused were to choose to 
disclose a line of defence at a stage in proceedings that was ‘unnecessarily and unjustifiably 
late’, this could have negative consequences for the right to have exculpatory material 
disclosed by the prosecution.182 This does suggest that the exercise of the right to silence can 
bring adverse consequences for the accused who opts not to reveal his or her lines of defence 
until a later stage in proceedings, as ‘the possibility exists that the Court will conclude that the 
continued trial is fair notwithstanding the failure to reveal … [the] identities [of exculpatory 
witnesses] to the accused’.183 
The right to silence can of course be waived. An accused who pleads guilty in effect waives 
the right to silence, as well as certain other procedural rights.184 This is often spelled out in 
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plea agreements at the ad hoc tribunals.185 Many accused before international tribunals have 
chosen to testify in their own defence. In the case of a defence of alibi, for example, it is 
virtually essential that the accused take the witness stand in order to explain his or her 
whereabouts at the time of the crime. 
h) Unsworn statement 
47 
The idea that an accused is entitled to make an unsworn oral or written statement in his or her 
defence, at least as a fundamental right, is a genuine innovation. There is nothing comparable 
in any of the international human rights instruments. But it is a practice recognized under 
many criminal codes throughout the world. In fact, continental European jurists are 
‘astonished’ that it could be otherwise, as in their jurisdictions the accused is never sworn.186 
The proposal first surfaced during the informal WG of the Aug. 1996 session of the 
PrepCom187. It was retained, in square brackets, by the WG in Aug. 1997,188 and adopted 
without difficulty at the Rome Conf.189 
48 
Under common law systems, an unsworn statement would in principle be inadmissible as 
evidence. If the accused chooses to testify, then he or she must be sworn and, moreover, must 
submit to cross-examination. Article 69(1) requires every witness to ‘give an undertaking as 
to the truthfulness of the evidence to be given by that witness’. In so doing, the witness 
submits to the possibility of prosecution for perjured testimony pursuant to Article 70(1). 
Although there is a lack of consistency with the terminology used in Article 67(1)(h), 
logically, testimony subsequent to the undertaking as to truthfulness must be the equivalent of 
a ‘sworn statement’. Therefore, the ‘unsworn statement’ seems to present itself as an 
exception to the general rule requiring that testimony be accompanied by an undertaking as to 
truthfulness. 
If an accused person elects to make an unsworn statement, he or she cannot be cross-
examined on the contents of that statement, as this would contravene the right to silence in 
Article 67(1)(g).190 Although the judges cannot consider the accused’s decision not to testify 
as a factor influencing guilt or innocence, in accordance with Article 67(1)(g), this surely does 
not require them to attribute the same weight, or any weight at all, to the unsworn statement. 
One judge held that to the extent that unsworn statement can be considered in the judgment, 
‘the accused are reminded that such statements constitute a waiver of their Article 67(1)(g) 
right to not to be compelled to “confess guilt and to remain silent, without such silence being 
a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence”’.191 Nevertheless, in granting an 
accused the right to address the AC, the Chamber noted that ‘the opportunity afforded to Mr 
Ngudjolo to make a personal address does not qualify as an unsworn oral or written statement 
within the meaning of Article 67(1)(h) of the Statute, which may attract evidentiary 
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weight’.192 The word ‘may’ is instructive here; it does not exclude the possibility that the 
statement be considered but indicates that there is no obligation on the TC to take the unsworn 
statement into account when reaching its final judgment. In its final judgment in that case, the 
TC said that only a statement made under oath by the accused would be considered part of the 
case record within the meaning of Article 74(2) although it acknowledged that ‘to a certain 
extent the Chamber took into account their statements under Article 67(1)(h)’.193 Another TC 
declined to consider an unsworn statement by the accused as forming part of the record of the 
trial.194 
The Statute and the RPE do not specify when such unsworn statements are to be made. 
Ntaganda made an unsworn statement at the beginning of his trial.195 A TC has said that 
Article 67(1)(h) ‘does not mean that the accused have the right to be given the floor whenever 
they wish’, and denied a request to make such a statement in conjunction with defence 
submissions seeking acquittal because there was no case to answer.196 An unsworn statement 
made at the sentencing hearing was referred to by the TC when it noted the absence of 
genuine remorse of the convicted person. The statement certainly did not benefit the 
convicted person and arguably contributed to the severity of the sentence.197 
i) Reverse onus 
49 
The prohibition of any reverse onus or duty or rebuttal is really a corollary of the presumption 
of innocence, protected by Article 66 of the ICC Statute. Reverse onus provisions are 
common to most criminal law systems.198 Upon proof of one fact, the Court is entitled, or in 
some cases is obliged, to conclude that another fact has been proven. Thus, the prosecution 
does not in reality prove a decisive fact in the case against the accused. The accused bears the 
onus of disproving such a fact, sometimes by raising a reasonable doubt as to its existence, 
and sometimes by actually proving the contrary, according to the principle of preponderance 
of evidence. Although many offences in national criminal codes are drafted in such a fashion, 
there are no examples in the ICC Statute. This does not mean that a reverse onus issue may 
not arise. For example, in the Čelebići trial before the ICTY, the TC noted that ‘there is a 
presumption of sanity of the person alleged to have committed the offence’199 and that the 
accused who raises a defence of insanity or diminished mental capacity ‘is to rebut the 
presumption of sanity’.200 In Bemba, the AC found that the TC had erroneously reversed the 
burden of proof when it admitted the totality of prosecution witness statements as a whole, 
leaving a burden on the accused to disprove the admissibility of items of evidence that had 
already been admitted.201  
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The provision was not included in the ILC Draft Statute, nor did it form part of the first series 
of amendments, during the 1996 sessions of the PrepCom. Article 67(1)(i) was proposed 
during the August 1997 meeting, although it was left in square brackets.202 It posed no 
problem during the debates at Rome and was adopted promptly.203 
II. Paragraph 2 
51 
International human rights law is somewhat uncertain as to an obligation on the prosecution to 
disclose evidence to the defence prior to trial. Although the instruments impose no clear duty 
in this respect,204 the ECtHR has declared ‘that it is a requirement of fairness … that the 
prosecution authorities disclose to the defence all material evidence for or against the 
accused’.205 The Rules of the ad hoc Tribunals make detailed provision for disclosure of the 
prosecution case and, according to more recent amendments, for the defence case as well.206 
A duty on the prosecution to disclose its evidence, both exculpatory and inculpatory, is now 
recognized in many legal systems.207 Existence of a reciprocal duty on the defence is less 
common although in some cases, such as a defence of alibi, the credibility of the defence will 
depend on prompt disclosure of material facts.208 In an interlocutory decision in the Tadić 
case, Judge Stephen said the defence has ‘no disclosure obligation at all unless an alibi or a 
special defence is sought to be relied upon and then only to a quite limited extent …’.209 It is 
obvious that the defence can never be required to disclose inculpatory evidence, as this would 
violate the right against self-incrimination set out in para. (g). 
52 
In an effort to clarify this point, the ILC proposed the following provisions, to comprise a 
second paragraph in the Article on rights of the accused: ‘Exculpatory evidence that becomes 
available to the Procuracy prior to the conclusion of the trial shall be made available to the 
defence. In case of doubt as to the application of this paragraph or as to the admissibility of 
the evidence, the TC shall decide’210. At the Aug.1996 session of the PrepCom, delegates 
observed that it was fundamental to a fair trial that provision be made for the full disclosure of 
evidence by the Prosecutor to the defence, and not only exculpatory evidence, as well as a 
reciprocal duty of disclosure on the part of the defence.211 At Rome, a new version submitted 
by Australia formed the basis of debate212. The Drafting Committee added, at the beginning of 
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the Australian text, the words ‘[i]n addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute 
…’. Australia had left two options as to the body competent for resolving questions about 
whether or not disclosure was required, the PTC and the TC. The PrepCom did not choose 
either, leaving the matter to ‘the Court’.213 
53 
It is perhaps unfortunate that the obligation on the prosecution to disclose all relevant 
evidence is not explicitly included within the provision concerning rights of the defence. It is 
surely implicit in the general right to a ‘fair hearing’ found within the chapeau of Article 67, 
especially in light of recent case law of international human rights tribunals. Moreover, 
Article 64 of the Statute, entitled ‘Functions and powers of the Trial Chamber’, requires that 
the TC ‘ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the 
rights of the accused’. In this context, the Statute imposes upon the TC assigned to deal with a 
case the obligation (‘the Trial Chamber … shall’; the ILC Draft had left this to the discretion 
of the Presidency214): ‘[s]ubject to any other relevant provisions of this Statute, [to] provide 
for disclosure of documents or information not previously disclosed, sufficiently in advance 
of the commencement of the trial to enable adequate preparation for trial’. The relevant 
provisions that may qualify somewhat this duty on the prosecution are Article 68(5), 
concerning protection of witnesses, and Article 72(1), concerning protection of national 
security information, which makes express reference to Article 67(2). 
The RPE of the ICC establish a thorough regime of disclosure, applicable to both Prosecutor 
and defence.215 The prosecution is required to provide the defence with the names of 
witnesses it intends to call at trial together with copies of their statements, subject to certain 
exceptions relating to the protection of the witnesses themselves.216 The defence has a 
corresponding obligation with respect to witnesses, although this is worded slightly more 
narrowly, applying only to those expected to support specific defences.217 Both sides are 
required to allow the other to inspect books, documents, photographs and other tangible 
objects in their possession or control which they intend to use as evidence. The Prosecutor 
must also disclose any such items that may be ‘material to the preparation of the defence’, 
pursuant to Rule 77 of the RPE, although a comparable duty is not imposed upon the defence 
to disclose items that might assist the prosecution218. This term has been interpreted quite 
broadly, and goes beyond those objects that are directly linked to exonerating and 
incriminating evidence, to include general background information in the Prosecutor’s 
possession.219 This broad interpretation follows the ICTR’s approach in Bagosora, where it 
was held that ‘preparation is a broad concept and does not necessarily require that the material 
itself counter the Prosecution case’.220 Similarly, the ICTY has concluded that documents and 
other objects ‘material to the preparation of the Defence’ consist of material that is ‘… 
significantly helpful to an understanding of important inculpatory or exculpatory evidence; it 
is material if there is a strong indication that … it will ‘play an important role in uncovering 
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admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation, corroborating testimony, or assisting 
impeachment or rebuttal”’.221 
54 
The second sentence of Article 67(2) provides for a determination by the Court in cases where 
the prosecution is not sure about the nature of the evidence. An early amendment described 
this as a hearing ‘ex parte’ and ‘in camera’.222 The Aug. 1997 session of the PrepCom 
included a cross-reference to the provision enabling the Court to make orders for the conduct 
of the trial (now Article 64(3)).223 Given that there are obligations of disclosure at both the 
pre-trial and the trial phase, and that the obligation set out in Article 67(2) must be respected 
‘as soon as practicable’, the appropriate body would be either the PTC or the TC, depending 
on the circumstances. It is unclear whether this provision entitles the Prosecutor to seek a 
ruling in cases of doubt, or whether the defence could also apply where it suspects the 
Prosecution may have such evidence. There may be circumstances where the Prosecutor 
cannot seek such a determination without informing the Court of the evidence in question, and 
it would obviously defeat the purpose of the provision to allow the defence access to such 
evidence prior to the determination by the Court that it must be disclosed. Yet the defence is 
entitled to be present at trial, and the trial must be public. Should the Court decide to conduct 
some form of ex parte determination, this must be done with the greatest discretion. The 
Court might consider appointing an amicus curiae to ensure that the rights of the defence are 
protected and to assess, in appropriate circumstances, the usefulness of an appeal of its 
decision pursuant to Article 81(2)(d) of the Statute. 
 
In the Lubanga case, two stays of proceedings were ordered owing to non-disclosure by the 
prosecution.224 The first, in 2008, found that the prosecution had erred in its use of Article 
54(3)(e) which allows the Prosecutor to make agreements not to disclose any documents or 
information obtained confidentially and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence.225 
Over 200 documents, which had either an undisputed exculpatory value or were material to 
the preparation of the defence, were obtained in this way and could not be disclosed as a 
result of the confidentiality agreements in place. The Chamber ‘unhesitatingly’ concluded that 
the fundamental right to a fair trial included the disclosure of exculpatory material,226 and that 
if one of the preconditions for fairness could not be present at trial, the trial must be stayed.227 
Ultimately, the Prosecutor secured agreement from those information providers permitting 
him to share the documents with the TC, which would in turn decide on disclosure in full, 
summary or redacted form.228 In 2010, a second stay of proceedings was ordered when the 
prosecution refused to disclose the identity of an intermediary, who had allegedly encouraged 
witnesses to provide false testimony.229 This was ultimately overturned by the AC, which 
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found that stays of proceedings were an exceptional remedy, which should only be granted 
where it was ‘impossible to piece together the constituent elements of a fair trial’.230 
C. Special remarks 
I. Omitted provisions 
55 
The drafts of Article 67 that were considered by the PrepCom contained two provisions based 
rather closely on the United States constitutional model rather than the international 
instruments. The first concerned the protection against unreasonable search and seizure,231 
while the second provided a guarantee not to be deprived of life or liberty without due 
process.232 Another proposal entitled the accused to invoke the Court’s power to compel state 
co-operation in order to assist the defence in the preparation of its case.233 They were deleted 
at the Rome Conf.234 The due process proposal is derived from Article V of the United States 
Bill of Rights, which is an anachronistic provision, in that it recognizes the legitimacy of 
capital punishment, something which is excluded from Article 77 and prohibited by 
contemporary human rights norms.235 In any case, the notion of ‘due process’ is comprised 
within that of ‘fair trial’ in the chapeau of Article 67(1) Search and seizure, too, is governed 
by other provisions in the Statute. The protection against unreasonable search and seizure in 
effect enables a court to sanction misconduct at the investigation stage. Here, the Court has 
the power to exclude evidence, pursuant to Article 69(7)(b) where its admission ‘would be 
antithetical to and would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings’. Finally, the state 
co-operation provision is also incorporated in other provisions of the Statute. 
II. Role of Article 67 in the applicable law 
56 
Article 67 closely resembles Article 14(3) the ICCPR, as well as the various fair trial clauses 
found in national constitutions. It is not, however, a typical provision found within criminal or 
penal codes as such. In effect, such clauses generally belong in constitution-type instruments, 
and claim a judicial role which is hierarchically superior to the criminal law texts that they 
frame and control. It is against the constitutional fair trial standard that provisions of the 
ordinary criminal law, as well as actions of the authorities in implementing it, including those 
of the Courts, are to be assessed. In national legal systems, two principal consequences result: 
where a provision of the ordinary criminal law is in conflict with the fundamental fair trial 
norm, the former must give way to the latter; where the investigating authorities, the 
prosecution or the Courts themselves have breached the fair trial rights of the accused, the 
Courts must grant an appropriate remedy, which may range from compensation to an order for 
a new trial and even, in some systems, the right to a stay of proceedings. 
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The application of these concepts to the ICC Statute is not obvious, and this raises questions 
about the role of Article 67 itself within the general structure and legal philosophy of the 
Statute. To take the case of a breach of Article 67 by the investigating authorities, the 
prosecution or the Courts, a number of scenarios may be contemplated. Although Article 67 
applies at the trial stage of the proceedings, it may be threatened by pre-trial events, such as 
irregular or illegal investigation, either by the national authorities or by the Prosecutor’s 
office. Article 69(7)(b) provides the Court with the power to exclude evidence in cases of 
abuse, but there may be breaches of Article 67 for which this may be an insufficient or 
inappropriate remedy. For example, what is the Court to do in cases of a violation of the right 
to a speedy trial, set out in Article 67(1)(c)? Jurisprudence from the ICTR suggests that a 
reduction in sentence in the case of conviction and monetary compensation where the 
defendant has been acquitted can remedy any prejudice suffered by a breach of this right.236 
As discussed above, the Court has granted stays of proceedings where a fair trial has been 
rendered impossible, even though no explicit power to do so is set out in the Statute. The 
power to grant a stay of proceedings in the event of an abuse of process by the Prosecutor is 
an inherent power of the Court to protect the integrity of proceedings. The approach of the 
Kenyatta TC, where the Prosecutor was ordered to either declare that it had sufficient 
evidence to proceed to trial or to withdraw the charges is another means through which delays 
in the pre-trial stage can be remedied.237 
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Even more difficult is the problem of applicable law that is incompatible with Article 67. In 
some cases, provisions of the Statute are explicitly protected from conflict with Article 67. 
For example, Article 67(1)(d) employs the words ‘[s]ubject to Article 63, paragraph 2 …’. In 
others, it was surely the intent to the Statute‘s drafters to except other provisions from the 
scope of Article 67. For example, despite the right to ‘raise defences’ set out in Article 
67(1)(e), this cannot be unlimited, because other provisions of the Statute prohibit or limit the 
defences of official capacity and superior orders. What if a provision of the applicable law is 
not sheltered, either implicitly or explicitly, from Article 67? Can the Court determine that it 
is inoperative to the extent that there is an incompatibility with the provisions of Article 67? If 
the Court may indeed make such a determination, does this only cover procedural issues or 
does it also concern substantive law? 
59 
It is suggested that Article 67, given its unique formulation and its historical origin, may be 
entitled to a form of hierarchically superior status within the Statute. In appropriate cases, 
some of which may have been unthinkable in July 1998 but which may become apparent over 
time, the Court may be required to declare provisions of the Statute inoperative because they 
conflict with Article 67. The ‘fair trial’ norm in the chapeau of Article 67(1) is a powerful 
concept and one that will evolve, in keeping with the development of international human 
rights law. Provisions of the Statute that meet the fair trial standard in 1998 may no longer do 
so at some point in the future. 
But for the sake of argument, even if it is assumed that the other norms in the Statute are 
either compatible with Article 67 or else they are implicit or explicit exceptions to it, it must 
be born in mind that much of the applicable law remains to be devised. The two other 
principal sources, the RPE and the EoC, are hierarchically subordinate to the Statute. 
Article 52(5) of the Rome Statute declares that in the event of conflict between it and the 
Rules, the Statute shall prevail. Rules of evidence adopted by the ASP may conflict with fair 
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trial rights enshrined in Article 67,238 and the Court is clearly entitled to disregard them or 
declare them inoperative in such cases. Moreover, the wording of Article 67 – particularly its 
reference to defences and to onus of proof – suggests that this extends to substantive as well 
as procedural matters. 
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